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In designing policies to promote bioenergy, policy makers face challenges concerning
uncertainties about the sustainability of bioenergy pathways (including greenhouse gas
balances), technology and resource costs, or future energy market framework conditions.
New information becomes available with time, but policy adjustments can involve high
levels of adaptation costs. To enable an effective steering of technology choices and
innovation, policies have to strike a balance between creating a consistent institutional
framework, which establishes planning security for investors, and sufficient flexibility to
adapt to new information. This paper examines implications of economic theory for
handling cost and benefit uncertainty in bioelectricity policy design, focussing on choices
between price and quantity instruments, technology differentiation, and policy adjust-
ment. Findings are applied to two case studies, the UK's Renewables Obligation and the
German feed-in tariff/feed-in premium scheme. Case study results show the trade-offs
that are involved in instrument choice and design e depending on political priorities and
a country's specific context, different options can prove more adequate. Combining
market-based remuneration with sustainability criteria results in strong incentives for
bioenergy producers to search for low-cost solutions; whereas cost-based price in-
struments with centrally steered technology and feedstock choices offer higher planning
security for investors and more direct control for policy makers over what pathways are
implemented. Independent of the choice of instrument type and technology differentiation
mechanism, findings emphasise the importance of a careful policy design, which
determines the exact balance between performance criteria such as cost control, incentive
intensity, planning security and adaptive efficiency.
© 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1846; fax: þ 49 0 341 235 4
(A. Purkus).
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Bioenergy use in the electricity sector plays an important role
in meeting renewable energy expansion and greenhouse gas
(GHG) mitigation targets in many EUmember states [1]. Due to
a lack of commercial competitiveness with fossil fuel-based
technologies, the uptake of bioelectricity technologies relies
heavily on policy incentives. From an economics perspective,
the rationale for policy intervention on behalf of bioenergy
lies in the correction of market failures. For one, negative GHG
externalities of fossil fuels distort competition with renewable
energy sources (RES). Furthermore, bioenergy can make a
positive contribution to the public good “secure energy supply”
[2], by substituting fossil fuel imports from geopolitically
instable regions [3], or by providing systemic benefits in an
electricity system with high shares of volatile RES, where
bioenergy can act as a renewable option for balancing fluctu-
ations [4]. At the same time, investments in innovative tech-
nologies and learning generate knowledge spillovers as
positive externalities. The existence of multiple market fail-
ures justifies the use of a policy mix combining instruments
like the European Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), which
sets a price on GHG emissions, and direct support instruments
aimed at promoting RES diffusion, like renewable quotas or
feed-in tariffs [5,6]. To ensure an effective innovation system
for low carbon technologies, demand-pull measures such as
these need to be further combined with instruments promot-
ing the supply of innovative technologies and knowledge
creation, such as research and development support [7e10].
Functioning knowledge exchange networks and economic and
political framework conditions which are conducive to inno-
vation are further elements of effective innovation systems
[7,8]. The focus of policy interventions,meanwhile, needs to be
aligned with a technology's stage of commercial maturity. For
bioenergy use in the electricity sector, deployment support is
of particular relevance, because major technologies such as
biogas and solid biofuel-based combined heat and power (CHP)
production have reached a comparatively high level of tech-
nological maturity, even though potentials for incremental
innovation remain [11,12]. The EU ETS as an indirect support
instrument fails to create a level playing field for competition
with conventional energy technologies, which benefit from
economies of scale, past learning effects and persistently low
levels of emission allowance prices [13,14]. Moreover, current
market framework conditions set only limited incentives for
the provision of flexible capacities, even though their systemic
importance is growing as shares of volatile RES increase
[15e17]. In this context, direct deployment support is neces-
sary to further develop bioenergy technologies as part of a
diverse RES portfolio, and reflect bioenergy's option value as a
dispatchable, low-carbon RES in the future electricity mix.
Meanwhile, the heterogeneity of technologyefeedstock
combinations and associated environmental and socio-
economic impacts makes it a difficult task to design policy
instruments which incentivise cost-effective contributions of
bioenergy to RES and GHG mitigation targets while also
ensuring the sustainability of developments [18]. Particularly
problematic for bioenergy policy design is the pervasive ex-
istence of uncertainty about the costs and benefits of variousPlease cite this article in press as: Purkus A, et al., Handling uncert
and German bioelectricity policy instruments, Biomass and Bioepathways. While uncertainty about the private cost charac-
teristics of RES plants and future learning curve effects is a
well-researched phenomenon [19,20], the heterogeneity of
bioenergy pathways and their dependency on biomass and
land resources adds several dimensions to the problem of
policy design under uncertainty (see Table 1).
Firstly, the future costs of bioenergy provision depend not
only on the extent of cost reductions associated with techno-
logicalprogressand learningbydoing, butalsoon resource cost
developments, which are in turn influenced by the demand for
competing biomass uses; as a result, the future competitive-
ness of bioenergy pathways can be associated with large un-
certainties [21].Moreover, bioenergyproductioncangive rise to
external costs (e.g. through negative impacts on biodiversity,
soils, water quality and availability), which depend on the
pathway in question as well as on local and regional circum-
stances [22]. On the benefit side, not only the level and slope of
the aggregate marginal benefit function of GHG mitigation is
uncertain [23,24], but also the extent of emission reductions
associated with different bioenergy pathways, because esti-
mates of GHG balances require numerous assumptions
[25e27]. The complexity of estimating GHGmitigation benefits
grows, once indirect land use effects of an increased biomass
demand are taken into account [28,29]. Also, it is difficult to
assess benefits related to the security of electricity supply;
those relating to the substitution of imports depend on which
fuels are replaced by bioenergy, whereas the value of systemic
benefits of flexible bioenergy provision depends on the future
availability of lowcarbonalternatives, suchas storage systems,
and their competitiveness.
Finally, given the existence of multiple externalities, policy
makers face the challenge of how to weigh external costs and
external benefits of a given pathway against each other and
solve associated trade-offs. Moreover, uncertainties do not
only apply to bioelectricity pathways, but also to the use of
biomass in transport, heating andmaterial applications in the
growing bioeconomy. The optimal future allocation of scarce
biomass resources remains unknown, because the future
availability of alternative, non-biomass GHG mitigation op-
tions in the different sectors determines where biomass use
would generate the largest benefits.
In the implementation phase, a further dimension of un-
certainty applies to the response of actors to policy incentives.
An important influence factor on market actors' behaviour is
the degree of policy uncertainty they perceive: the profitability
of investments depends heavily on policy incentives, so that
market actors will only be willing to carry them out if they
have sufficient safeguards and confidence in their continued
existence [20,30,31]. Policy makers therefore face a trade-off:
over time, as the policy is implemented, new information
becomes available and learning takes place, reducing some of
the uncertainties named above. The flexibility to adjust the
policy, however, results in an increase in policy uncertainty.
On the other hand, policies which create very stable expec-
tations and ensure high planning security reduce uncertainty
about how market actors will respond to them, but flexibility
to correct errors and respond to new developments is lost.
In this paper, we explore what answers economic theory has
to offer for dealing with this trade-off, and apply findings to
the analysis of two case studies.ainty in bioenergy policy designeA case study analysis of UK
nergy (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.biombioe.2015.03.029
Table 1 e Major uncertainties in bioenergy policy making.
Stage of political
decision making
Type of uncertainty Dimensions
Rationale for bioenergy
support and design of
support mechanism
Static cost uncertainty Uncertainty about private costs of bioenergy production, i.e. the position
and shape of the aggregated marginal cost curve of bioenergy producers is
not known to policy makers
Dynamic cost uncertainty Uncertainty about cost reductions through learning curve effects and
economies of scale
Uncertainty about resource cost developments
Uncertainty about external
costs of bioenergy production
Uncertainty about negative externalities associated with a specific
bioenergy pathway (arising from e.g. negative impacts on soils,
water quality and availability, biodiversity, particulate emissions
during bioenergy conversion and use)
Uncertainty about GHG
mitigation benefits
Uncertainty about aggregate marginal damage function of GHG emissions
Uncertainty about GHG balances of bioenergy pathways
Uncertainty about indirect land use changes and associated GHG emissions
Uncertainty about security
of supply benefits
Uncertainty about benefits of import substitution
Uncertainty about future competitiveness of bioelectricity plants'
contributions to system stability
Uncertainty about how to balance
multiple externalities
Uncertainty about what weight should be given to which external
benefits and costs
Uncertainty about optimal
biomass allocation
Uncertainty about current and future conditions of reference systems in
different energy and bioeconomy sectors
Implementation
of support scheme
Uncertainty about the response of
actors to policy incentives
Uncertainty about the correctness of behavioural assumptions
(e.g. concerning rational behaviour)
Uncertainty regarding interactions between bioenergy policy incentives
and other policies and macroeconomic framework conditions
On the side of market actors, uncertainty about the credible commitment
of policy makers (policy uncertainty)
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parameters of instrument design appear particularly relevant:
the choice between price and quantity instruments, the dif-
ferentiation of support between various bioenergy technolo-
gies and feedstocks, and the mechanism for implementing
policy adjustments. Applying insights from the price vs.
quantity literature, new institutional economics, and the
theory of risk allocation, Section 2 discusses implications for
the design of these parameters under simultaneous cost and
benefit uncertainty. Also, it is examined which issues are
regarded as solved in the literature, and which remain prob-
lematic. Focussing on the latter, Section 3 analyses two case
studies of different solutions which have been adopted in
practice: the UK Renewables Obligation as an example of a
quantity-oriented instrument in which market actors' tech-
nology and feedstock choices have to comply with sustain-
ability requirements; and the German feed-in tariff/feed-in
premium scheme as a price-oriented instrument, in which
policy makers decide on which pathways show acceptable
cost-benefit-balances to merit reference cost-based support.
The case studies have been chosen based on instrument
characteristics, and because in both countries, bioenergy is
envisioned to make a sizable contribution to RES targets,
making bioenergy policy design a question of high interest
(see Fig. 1). Both in the UK and Germany, deployment support
schemes are currently in transition (to the Contracts for Dif-
ference (Cfd) scheme and a competitive bidding scheme,
respectively). Insights about how existing schemes have per-
formed in addressing uncertainty-related challenges can
provide relevant lessons for this process e the more so, since
questions regarding the design of technology differentiation
and adjustment mechanisms are not specific to a particularPlease cite this article in press as: Purkus A, et al., Handling uncert
and German bioelectricity policy instruments, Biomass and Bioeinstrument type. Following a discussion of policy recom-
mendations, Section 4 concludes.2. Handling uncertainty in instrument
choice and design e contributions of economic
theory
Bioenergy policy makers have to make decisions under un-
certainty about the level and slope of both the aggregated
marginal cost (MC) curve of bioenergy production, including
private and external costs, and the aggregated marginal
benefit (MB) function, including various external benefits (see
Fig. 2). Some aspects of this problem have drawn considerable
attention in economic research and robust solutions have
been proposed. For example, the inability to identify an
optimal degree of bioenergy provision due to uncertainty
about the intersection of MC and MB curves has been
addressed by the standard-price approach, which seeks to
implement a politically set target at least costs to achieve
“efficiency without optimality” [33]. Other aspects remain
more problematic. In the following, economic theory impli-
cations are examined for the questions of choosing between
price and quantity instruments, technology differentiation,
and policy adjustment.
2.1. Choice between price and quantity instruments
under uncertainty
Since Weitzman [35] it is well established that under uncer-
tainty, price and quantity instruments are not equivalent in
their effects. Particularly, the presence of cost uncertainty isainty in bioenergy policy designeA case study analysis of UK
nergy (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.biombioe.2015.03.029
Fig. 1 e Expected role of bioenergy in meeting the EU Renewable Energy Directive's 2020 targets in the electricity sector:
projections for Germany and the UK according to National Renewable Energy Action Plans. Source: own illustration, based
on data from ECN [32].
b i om a s s a n d b i o e n e r g y x x x ( 2 0 1 5 ) 1e1 64found to affect the efficiency of instrument choices, whereas
errors in assessing the MB curve's position result in the same
social costs for both instrument types [33,36,37]. Under un-
certainty about theMC function, quantity instruments such asMC, MB of 
bioenergy 
production 
MCexpected 
Q*actual 
MCactual 
MBexpected 
MBactual 
Quantity of 
bioenergy 
produced 
Q*expected 
P*expected 
P*actual 
Fig. 2 e Simultaneous uncertainty about the marginal cost
and benefit curves of bioenergy production. Note: P*:
optimal price; Q* optimal quantity; MC: marginal costs; MB:
marginal benefits Source: based on Hepburn [34].
Please cite this article in press as: Purkus A, et al., Handling uncert
and German bioelectricity policy instruments, Biomass and Bioerenewables quotas or competitive bidding processes assure
that a given target is reached, but the costs of doing so remain
uncertain; market actors exploit the cheapest RES options
first, but then move on to successively more expensive op-
tions. Price instruments, such as feed-in tariffs, offer a higher
degree of cost control; the most expensive technology
employedwill be the onewhich is just about profitable under a
given feed-in tariff rate. However, meetings targets will
require repeated adjustments of price incentives, which can
increase policy uncertainty for RES investors [19].
The advantages of adopting price or quantity instruments
under uncertainty depend on the relative slopes of MC andMB
curves [35]. If the MC curve is comparatively steep, price in-
struments will achieve a better welfare result; whereas if the
MC curve's slope is comparatively gentle, a quantity instru-
ment would be the favoured solution. In the case of CO2
emissions, it is argued that the MB curve is relatively flat at
least in the short-to mid-term [23,24]. As to the MC curve of
RES, Menanteau, Finon and Lamy [19] and Finon and Perez [20]
argue for a relatively flat curve on a large range of cumulative
installed capacity; this would favour a quantity instrument,
because a price instrument could lead to large errors in target
achievement. In the case of bioenergy, however, the MC
curve's slope depends on whether the scale of bioenergy
expansion aimed for is significant compared to the available
resources. TheMC curvemay be relatively flat for low levels of
bioenergy use relying on the use of low competitionainty in bioenergy policy designeA case study analysis of UK
nergy (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.biombioe.2015.03.029
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implementation, if competition for feedstock and land in-
creases [21,38]. Therefore, the relative advantages of price and
quantity instruments may change depending on the scale of
bioenergy use.
Other relevant factors in the choice between price and
quantity instruments are static and dynamic efficiency con-
siderations. Quantity instruments perform better in exacting
pressure to reduce costs, because producers compete on a
price basis; price instruments allow producers a higher sur-
plus by comparison [19]. Producers can take this surplus as
profit, but also invest it in research and development activ-
ities, to bring down costs and increase future profits. In this
case, associated knowledge and learning spillovers would
speed up innovation. With a quantity instrument, on the
other hand, risk adverse investorswill require price premiums
to compensate for price volatility, increasing the costs of
achieving targets [19,20].
Nonetheless, some open questions remain, which appear
relevant for bioenergy policy. In practice, policy makers often
opt for hybrid instruments with both price and quantity el-
ements [34]. In the case of bioenergy with its multiple mar-
ket failures and uncertainties, it is of interest whether such
combinations increase or decrease efficiency. Furthermore,
Stavins [39] shows that benefit uncertainty does matter if it
is correlated with cost uncertainty, and can in fact reverse
price versus quantity recommendations in such cases. While
a positive correlation favours quantity instruments, a nega-
tive correlation increases the advantages of price in-
struments. With bioenergy, it seems reasonable to assume a
non-zero correlation, but depending on the pathway in
question, it may be negative or positive. For example, the use
of lignocellulosic feedstocks grown on marginal land can
provide beneficial GHG balances and environmental co-
benefits, but can also increase production costs [40]. The
use of low competition wastes likewise allows for high GHG
savings, but at low costs. Given that it is not feasible to es-
timate relative slopes and correlation effects for all bio-
energy pathways and implement separate instruments, the
problem of heterogeneous pathways needs to be addressed
through selection mechanisms as part of technology
differentiation.
2.2. Differentiation between technologies and feedstocks
Policy makers can set framework conditions and leave tech-
nology and feedstock choices up to market actors, or try to
steer choices more directly by setting technology- and/or
feedstock-specific incentives. Technology neutral support
incentivises the use of RES technologies with the lowest costs;
however, when respective potentials are exhausted, there is a
sharp increase in marginal production costs, because the next
cheapest technology is still at a market introduction stage
[19,20]. Dynamic efficiency considerations therefore argue for
a differentiation of support, to move a portfolio of RES tech-
nologies down the learning curve and reduce costs of RES
production in the long term. In EUmember states, RES support
instruments show convergence towards the use of technology
differentiation, irrespective of whether price or quantity
instruments are used [41].Please cite this article in press as: Purkus A, et al., Handling uncert
and German bioelectricity policy instruments, Biomass and BioeIn the case of bioenergy, cost characteristics of pathways
are very heterogeneous, depending on feedstocks and the
technologies' stage in the learning curve. This poses the
question what degree of differentiation would be sensible
within the technology group of bioenergy. A uniform support
level for all bioelectricity optionswithout any further selection
mechanism does not seem promising; this would incentivise
the use of low-cost technologyefeedstock combinations, but
disregard differences in external costs and benefits. Basic
options for differentiation would be:
1) A uniform support level with minimum sustainability
criteria:here,all technologyefeedstockcombinationswould
beeligible for support, as longas theyprovecompliancewith
minimum criteria regarding external costs and benefits.
2) Technology-specific support levels: here, different tech-
nologyefeedstock combinations receive different levels of
support, according to policy makers' assessment of their
specific cost and benefits.
In evaluating the respective advantages of alternatives,
new institutional economics can offer useful insights. An
important distinction is the degree of incentive intensity and
planning security that alternative differentiationmechanisms
imply [42,43]. Incentive intensity is high, if bioelectricity pro-
ducers face high-powered market incentives to search for
low-cost solutions. If, on the other hand, policy makers steer
technology choices more centrally by offering high invest-
ment safeguards for selected technologies, incentive intensity
to engage in decentralised search processes is lower, but
bioelectricity producers have higher planning security for
their investments. In case of a uniform support level with no
further differentiation beyond sustainability requirements,
technology choices are made by market actors, who can use
dispersed and context-dependent information in developing
solutions [43,44]. Independent of whether the support level is
fixed centrally or determined competitively, bioenergy in-
vestors would have a high incentive intensity to reduce pro-
duction costs and costs of compliance with sustainability
criteria, in order tomaximise profits. However, there would be
few incentives to provide external benefits exceeding mini-
mum requirements. In case of technology-specific support
levels, greater information requirements apply to policy
makers, which have to decide on which support level to grant
to which technologies. As decisions apply to all eligible bio-
energy projects, costs of errors are large; on the other hand,
transaction costs are likely to be lower than under sustain-
ability certification [45]. Themore detailed prescriptionsmade
by policy makers become, the lower is the incentive intensity
for market actors to engage in search processes.
Different forms of technology differentiation have impli-
cations for type and level of uncertainties that market actors
and policy makers face, as has the choice between quantity
and price instruments (see Fig. 3). If remuneration is deter-
mined bymarkets (such as in quotas or bidding schemes), and
producers have to prove compliance with sustainability
criteria taking into account most recent scientific knowledge,
a large share of cost- and benefit-related uncertainties is
borne by market actors. If policy makers select specific bio-
energy pathways for which cost-based support is provided,ainty in bioenergy policy designeA case study analysis of UK
nergy (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.biombioe.2015.03.029
Fig. 3 e Alternative options for differentiating between
bioenergy technologies and feedstocks Note: FIT and quota
schemes are used as illustrative examples.
b i om a s s a n d b i o e n e r g y x x x ( 2 0 1 5 ) 1e1 66and credibly assure that support for existing plants will not be
affected by changes in framework conditions or advances in
scientific knowledge, the brunt of uncertainties is borne by the
state. While this lowers incentives for reducing costs or
improving environmental balances, planning security for
investments is significantly higher. This is particularly
important for transactions with a high degree of asset speci-
ficity, such as investments in dedicated biomass plants,
whose profitability depends on the ongoing existence of policy
incentives. Without sufficient investment safeguards, asset
specific investments would require high price premiums to be
realised, or not be undertaken at all [20,42].
In balancing incentive intensity and investment safe-
guards, it seems sensible to share uncertainties in the regu-
latory contract. As to who should bear which uncertainties,
the theory of risk allocation offers some insights [46,47]:
1) Risk should be allocated to actors who can best control the
risky outcome, i.e. actors who can influence the risky
variable or can at least limit risk.
2) Risk should be allocated to actors who can bear it at the
lowest costs; e.g. because they are less risk-averse, because
they can hedge risks and insure against them, or because
they can spread risks among many people.
3) Transaction costs (including information, negotiation,
contract implementation and monitoring costs) of allo-
cating risks among parties must be taken into account.
Originally applied to problems of policy design under risk,
these insights can be transferred to problems involving more
far-reaching uncertainties e under risk, the probability dis-
tribution of outcomes is known, whereas under uncertainty,
this is not the case [48]. For the sake of simplification, uncer-
tainty is here understood to encompass both forms of
incomplete knowledge.Please cite this article in press as: Purkus A, et al., Handling uncert
and German bioelectricity policy instruments, Biomass and BioeWho can bear uncertainties at the lowest costs is discussed
controversially in the literature. For example, the state can
spread out cost uncertainties among tax payers, but ineffi-
cient incentives in public administration can reduce the
effectiveness with which they are managed [47,49]. The
transaction costs of allocating uncertainties depend on their
current allocation, and are therefore strongly context-
dependent. Here, we focus on the degree of control over
uncertain outcomes.
In general, the ability to use dispersed knowledge gives
market actors an advantage in dealing with private cost
uncertainties, particularly those that can be described as
“normal market uncertainties” (e.g. uncertainties about price
and resource cost developments). The state has clear advan-
tages in deciding about the balancing of externalities. More-
over, while the optimal current and future allocation of
biomass resources is unknown to market actors and policy
makers alike, the latter can account for cross-sectoral
interactions of policy and market incentives which influence
allocative outcomes when designing policies. Less clear is the
case with uncertainties relating to dynamic costs, external
costs, GHG mitigation and security of supply benefits (see
Table 2), making a more detailed analysis necessary.
2.3. Policy adjustment
Transaction cost economics-based policy analyses stress the
importance of long-term commitment and credibility to
enable an effective governance of transactions [20,50].
A certain incompleteness in regulatory contracts, which
allows for flexibility, is part of ensuring this credibility, mak-
ing adequate adjustment mechanisms a prerequisite for
robust regulations [20,42]. Likewise, the theory of institutional
change highlights the importance of being able to correct
errors and to adapt to unforeseen circumstances [51]. In order
to meet requirements of adaptive efficiency, adjustment
mechanisms should ensure the potential reversibility of
policy impacts, in order to avoid a lock-in into inefficient
pathways of economic development. Moreover, policy mea-
sures should ensure openness to experimentation; the more
actors' choices and innovation opportunities are constrained,
the higher the risk of incurring a lock-in[51].
However, policy adjustments can lead to policy uncer-
tainty, especially if they are discretionary in nature; for
balancing flexibility and planning security, transparent pro-
visions for renegotiation and adaptation and ex ante flexibility
rules are recommended [50]. A related question is who should
bear the costs of policy adjustments. Literature suggests that
for adjustments associatedwith changes in political priorities,
costs should be borne by the state, because otherwise policy
uncertainty for investors would be too high [46]. For adjust-
ments responding to new scientific knowledge, e.g. regarding
GHG balances, it appears important that the planning security
of plants already in operation is not compromised [34]. For
example, research suggests that for bioelectricity supply
chains based on forest residues, methane emissions during
the storage of feedstocks may diminish GHG mitigation
potentials [52,53]. Emissions can be reduced through technical
drying, but this requires additional investments. Policy
adjustments would need to find a compromise betweenainty in bioenergy policy designeA case study analysis of UK
nergy (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.biombioe.2015.03.029
Table 2 e Allocation of uncertainties between market actors and the state e differences in the degree of control over
uncertain outcomes.
Type of uncertainty Ability to control outcome
Market actors State
Static costs (þ)
Control planning of investments
and operation of bioenergy plants
()
Can only indirectly influence investment decisions;
information asymmetry between state and producers
Dynamic costs (±)
Control R&D investment decisions and
sourcing decisions, but learning curve effects
depend on aggregated market developments
(±)
Can set incentives for innovation and diffusion of
specific technologies
External costs of
bioenergy production
(±)
Production decisions affect external costs, but
their extent may not be understood, and
incentives are needed to take them into account
(±)
State can promote improvements in scientific
understanding, but environmental impacts can
be strongly dependent on spatial context
GHG mitigation
benefits
(±)
Production decisions affect GHG balance,
but impacts may not be understood, and
incentives are needed to take them into account
(±)
State can promote improvements in scientific
understanding, and assess ILUC impacts; but
actual GHG balance is determined
by supply chain decisions
Security of supply
benefits
(±)
Production mode (flexible/inflexible) influences
system benefits
(±)
Benefits are determined by framework conditions
(e.g. share of volatile RES, security of imports), but also
depend on production and investment decisions
Uncertainty about how to
balance multiple
externalities
()
Externalities affect wider public, not bioenergy
producers
(þ)
Requires democratic decision making process
Uncertainty about optimal
biomass allocation
()
Allocative outcome results from aggregated
demand and supply, as influenced by market
and political framework conditions
(þ)
State influences allocation by setting policy incentives;
cross-sectoral coordination of policy instruments required
Note: (þ) comparatively high degree of control over outcomes; () comparatively low degree of control; (±) control over some aspects of
outcomes, not over others.
b i om a s s a n d b i o e n e r g y x x x ( 2 0 1 5 ) 1e1 6 7improving the GHG balance of existing plants and imposing
additional costs on plant operators, so as not to inhibit future
investments. In some situations, offering compensation for
the costs of additional investments can be an option (see 3.3).
Lastly, given that adjustments may affect the current and
future allocation of property rights, political transaction costs
of renegotiating regulatory contracts can be significant [54];
these too need to be taken into account when designing
adjustment mechanisms.
Of course, adjustment mechanisms are not independent
from other policy design choices. Therefore, an interesting
question for bioenergy policy is whether it is possible to
identify a higher compatibility of adaptive efficiency with
price or quantity instruments and different approaches to
technology differentiation, and what implications for policy
uncertainty and transaction costs of adaptation arise. For
these and the other open questions identified above, case
studies can yield useful insights.3. Case study analysis of the UK Renewables
obligation and the German feed-in tariff/feed-in
premium scheme
Exemplifying different approaches of instrument choice,
technology differentiation and policy adjustment, this section
analyses the UK Renewables Obligation (RO) [55,56] and thePlease cite this article in press as: Purkus A, et al., Handling uncert
and German bioelectricity policy instruments, Biomass and BioeGerman feed-in tariff (FIT)/feed-in premium (FIP) scheme
[57,58] to examine how theoretically interesting questions as
identified under Section 2 have been addressed in practice.
Regarding the choice between price, quantity and hybrid in-
struments, we first analyse how well the case studies succeed
in minimizing social costs of errors. Then, we examine how
uncertainties have been allocated in respective approaches to
technology differentiation, and how trade-offs between
incentive intensity and planning security have been solved.
Lastly, we discuss adjustment mechanisms' implications
for adaptive efficiency, transaction costs of adjustments,
and policy uncertainty. Central characteristics of the RO and
FIT/FIP schemes are summarised in Table 3.3.1. Prices versus quantities versus hybrids: the social
costs of errors
In quantity instruments, there is in principle a high uncer-
tainty about what level of bioenergy use will be induced to
fulfil RES quotas, and how high associated production costs
and external costs will be. In the RO, this uncertainty is
reduced by the price ceiling which places a limit on private
costs at least; it limits uncertainty for obligated suppliers and
signals the outer limit of feasible costs to bioenergy producers.
For policy makers, the technology bands introduce a measure
of control over the technology mix. On the other hand, the
price ceiling increases uncertainty about reaching RES targets;ainty in bioenergy policy designeA case study analysis of UK
nergy (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.biombioe.2015.03.029
Table 3 e Characterisation of the renewables obligation and the feed-in tariff/feed-in premium scheme as main support
instruments in UK and German bioelectricity policy.
Characterisation of policy elements
UK Legally binding targets 34% GHG emission reductions by 2020, 80% by 2050 (base year 1990); 15%
RES share in final energy consumption by 2020
Main support instrument Renewables Obligation (RO) as quantity instrument with price ceiling
(closes to new entrants in 2017, to be replaced by Contracts for Difference
(CfD) scheme)
Technology differentiation Since 2009, technology bands determine the level of ROCs per megawatt-
hour which RES receive for 20 years; bioenergy support levels depend on
technology, feedstock, and time of a plant's accreditation under the RO
Determination of remuneration Value of renewable obligation certificates (ROCs) determined by markets
(bilateral trading); buy-out price as price ceiling
Incentives for GHG benefits Minimum GHG reduction requirements, trajectory defined up to 2030
(for plants  1 MW)
Incentives for security of supply benefits 12 of 18 biomass bands apply to co-firing and conversions, to incentivise
RES electricity production compatible with the existing electricity system
Consideration of external costs Compliance with land and forest sustainability criteria mandatory
(for plants  1 MW)
Adjustment mechanism 4 yearly banding reviews, emergency reviews possible under specified
circumstances (e.g. significant variations in net costs); ROC levels decline
over time, while GHG reduction requirements increase
Other RES support instruments in the
electricity sector
Technology-specific feed-in tariffs for RES 5 MW (biomass: for AD only);
CfD for large-scale RES and nuclear; EU Emissions Trading System with
national carbon price floor in the electricity sector; R&D support
Germany Legally binding targets 40% GHG emission reductions by 2020 (base year 1990); 18% RES share in
final energy consumption by 2020; 40e45% RES share in final electricity
consumption by 2025, 80% by 2050
Main support instrument Feed-in tariffs (FIT) as price instrument; sliding feed-in premium (FIP) as
price instrument (to be gradually expanded to all RES plants > 100 kW until
2016); EEG 2014 has introduced a “breathing cap” as a quantity constraint
on bioenergy expansion (100 MW per year).
Technology differentiation Cost-based, technology-specific FIT rates which producers receive for 20
years; these also act as FIP reference prices (FIP: compensates for
differences between reference prices and average monthly market value of
RES electricity). Bioenergy FIT rates depend on installed capacity,
technology, feedstock, and time of commissioning; support is limited to
dedicated biomass plants 20 MW electric capacity
Determination of remuneration Central, by policy makers; in FIP limited market element (direct marketing
revenues may deviate from average market value used in premium
calculation)
Incentives for GHG benefits Through choice of supported technologies and feedstocks; additional
prerequisites for funding may apply (e.g. mandatory minimum heat use in
EEG 2012)
Incentives for security of supply benefits Capacity-oriented flexibility premium; FIP offers possibility of increasing
profits through demand-oriented feed-in and participation in balancing
markets; additional requirements on biogas plant flexibility in EEG 2014
Consideration of external costs Through choice of supported technologies and feedstocks; additional
prerequisites for funding may apply (e.g. cap onmaize and cereal grain use
in EEG 2012)
Adjustment mechanism Revisions of the EEG when deemed necessary based on monitoring;
between revisions, ordinances can be issued regarding specified topics;
FIT rates decline over time
Other RES support instruments in the
electricity sector
EU Emissions Trading System; R&D support
Note: only RO specifications for England andWales are considered; different specifications apply for Northern Ireland and Scottish Renewables
Obligations.
Sources: based on [55,57e61].
b i om a s s a n d b i o e n e r g y x x x ( 2 0 1 5 ) 1e1 68the same is true for the banded allocation of ROs, which
distorts the direct link between the number of Renewables
Obligation Certificates (ROCs) and the amount of RES
electricity produced. For limiting uncertainty about external
costs, sustainability certification constitutes the main instru-
ment (see 3.2) [56].Please cite this article in press as: Purkus A, et al., Handling uncert
and German bioelectricity policy instruments, Biomass and BioeIn the FIT/FIP, policy makers have a more direct control of
private costs; however, comparatively high levels of support
have led to a large increase particularly in crop-based anaer-
obic digestion (AD), and a lively debate about associated
external costs and total support costs [62,63]. The response
were significant reductions in reference prices in 2012 andainty in bioenergy policy designeA case study analysis of UK
nergy (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.biombioe.2015.03.029
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Fig. 5 e Effects of the FIT/FIP scheme's “breathing cap” as a
quantity constraint under cost uncertainty. Source: based
on Menanteau, Finon and Lamy [19].
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ergy yields [64] make it difficult to assess with confidence
which bioelectricity pathways will respond how to changes in
price incentives, adding to uncertainty about total future
support costs as well as external costs. In response, the 2014
revision of the Renewable Energy Sources Act (Erneuerbare-
Energien-Gesetz, EEG) has introduced an additional quantity
constraint. If in the course of a year, the gross growth of
installed bioenergy capacity exceeds 100 MW, remuneration
rates are subject to an accelerated decrease (compared to the
normal dynamic decrease). While limiting cost uncertainties
for policy makers, this measure increases uncertainty for
project developers.
Both price ceiling and quantity constraint introduce hybrid
elements into RO and FIT/FIP, respectively, in order to limit
the social costs of erroneous judgements about the MC curve
of bioenergy production (see Figs. 4 and 5). In the RO, the price
ceiling, which applies equally to all RES technologies, limits
bioenergy expansion if it turned out to be more expensive
than expected. If, conversely, bioenergy productionwas found
to be comparatively cheap, ROC prices in the RO would adapt
accordingly; the structure of RES production used to fulfil the
quota would shift in favour of bioenergy. In the reference
cost-based FIT/FIP, the quantity constraint guards against
lower-than-expected production costs, which would lead to
higher levels of bioenergy use than envisioned. The con-
straint's design as a “breathing cap” would allow bioenergy
production to expand even once the accelerated decrease in
remuneration kicks in, until reference prices equal actual
marginal costs. However, if theMB curve of bioenergy use was
steeper than expected, the quantity constraint could lead to
errors on the side of caution if set too low.While the RO's price
ceiling primarily limits private costs, the FIT/FIP's quantity
constraint offers a certain degree of control over external
costs as well, if these are likely to increase with the extent of
bioenergy expansion. Therefore, “breathing caps”, whichMCprivate of 
bioenergy 
production 
MCexpected 
MCactual 
Quantity of 
bioenergy 
produced 
Qtarget 
Pexpected 
Price ceiling 
Pactual 
Qrealised 
Fig. 4 e Effects of the RO's price ceiling under cost
uncertainty. Source: based on Menanteau, Finon and
Lamy [19].
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and German bioelectricity policy instruments, Biomass and Bioeadjust remuneration depending on the amount of capacity
already installed within a certain period, can be a sensible
option for reducing uncertainty about the social costs of errors
for policy makers. However, it remains challenging not to set
the quantity constraint too high or too low, and also, an
adequate planning horizon for adjustments is needed. In case
of the EEG 2014, the constraint is likely to be set too low and
the three-monthly adjustment period too short to allow for an
effective steering of dynamic developments [65].3.2. Technology differentiation: allocation of
uncertainty, incentive intensity and planning security
Both cases adopt a technology-specific approach, but the
degree to which policy makers centrally steer technology and
feedstock decisions differs. Under the RO, the cost-side of
decisions is left to market actors, who need to assess what
technologies and feedstocks are likely to be viable under ROC
contracts. The steering influence of policymakers is limited to
setting bands, with the relative number of ROCs for certain
technologies and feedstocks depending on expectations about
current costs and innovative potential. However, there is no
direct control over whether technologies are actually taken
up. On the benefit side, sustainability certification ensures
compliance with minimum standards, reducing uncertainty
about GHGmitigation benefits and external costs of bioenergy
production for policy makers. At the same time, a larger share
of these uncertainties is allocated to market actors, who
have to ensure that their supply chains meet sustainability
requirements. To dampen uncertainties for bioenergy pro-
ducers, there is a progressive tightening of GHG requirements
which allows for an improvement of supply chains over time,
and a one year period in which only reporting is required.
Also, GHG accountingmethodology is provided by the state, as
well as a guarantee that neither it nor the GHG trajectory will
be changed unilaterally until 2027 [56]. As a result, the stateainty in bioenergy policy designeA case study analysis of UK
nergy (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.biombioe.2015.03.029
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problem of undertaking a credible self-commitment in face
of major new discoveries remains. Moreover, policy makers
bear uncertainties related to external costs not reflected in
sustainability criteria; in effect, bioenergy producers have few
incentives to provide a higher level of environmental perfor-
mance than required in the defined minimum requirements.
For security of supply benefits, there is no special steering
mechanism, but co-firing or the conversion of fossil fuel
plants, where biomass directly replaces coal, is seen as
compatible with envisioned electricity sector developments
[66]. Compared to Germany, this reflects the UK's focus on a
low carbon transition with ongoing central, non-intermittent
power production and a strong role for nuclear power and
CCS, instead of a more decentralised energy transition with
large shares of intermittent RES.
By setting FIT/FIP reference prices and additional eligibility
requirements, policy makers in Germany have a more direct
control over what technologyefeedstock combinations are
likely to be profitable and realised. By setting fixed prices,
policy makers take on a large share of static and dynamic cost
uncertainties, although bioenergy investors have to handle
uncertainty about feedstock cost developments which affect
plant profitability. In the absence ofminimumGHGmitigation
requirements and certification, GHG uncertainty is also fully
borne by policy makers, same as uncertainty about external
costs. By providing feedstock-specific tariff rates, the EEG 2012
attempted to set incentives for the use of feedstocks with a
beneficial environmental balance but comparatively high
costs [67]. Moreover, minimum heat use requirements and a
cap on maize in biogas plants were used to enhance GHG
benefits and limit external costs. The EEG 2014 has abolished
feedstock differentiation and additional requirements e the
expectation is that only pathways based on wastes and resi-
dues will remain profitable under strongly reduced general
remuneration, which would by default have good GHG bal-
ances and low external costs [68]. However, it is uncertain
whether this will be so, given that many low-cost wastes and
residual potentials are already in use [65]. Concerning security
of supply benefits, positive incentives for flexible production
are provided in both EEG 2012 and 2014 (see Table 3). Addi-
tionally, the current revision introduces certain requirements
for new biogas plants, which aim at making flexible produc-
tion the only viable model. The use of inflexible requirements,
however, poses the risk that benefits of other concepts (e.g.
biogas CHP) may be neglected.
In sum, in the FIT/FIP scheme policy makers bear a
significantly larger share of uncertainties about static and
dynamic costs, GHG benefits and external costs than under
the RO. While this allows for a higher degree of control over
developments in the bioelectricity market, information re-
quirements on policy makers are high, leading to frequent
adjustments of reference prices and eligibility requirements
[67]. Meanwhile, differences in the allocation of uncertainties
have important implications for incentive intensity and
planning security. In Germany, there is a high degree of
planning security for plants once they become operational, as
changes in reference prices and requirements only affect
new plants; therefore, the FIP/FIT scheme has been successful
in attracting high levels of asset specific investments [69].Please cite this article in press as: Purkus A, et al., Handling uncert
and German bioelectricity policy instruments, Biomass and BioeWhile incentives to reduce costs result from profit max-
imisation, savings in the operation of existing plants are not
passed on to society; however, new plants can benefit from
accelerated learning curve effects. As for GHG benefits and
external costs, incentive intensity to implement improve-
ments is low for existing plants. New plants have incentives
to improve environmental balances insofar as a tightening
of requirements is expected in upcoming revisions (see 3.3).
In contrast, the RO, wheremarket actors bear a larger share
of cost and benefit uncertainties, provides strong incentives to
lower production costs, as long as minimum sustainability
criteria are complied with. Also, the progressive tightening
of GHG requirements sets incentives to improve GHG balances
over time. Investors have planning security regarding the
level of ROCs they receive and the nature of sustainability
criteria, as long as the commitment not to undertake unilat-
eral changes is considered as credible. However, particularly
asset specific dedicated biomass projects have to be very
confident they can secure adequate contracts for their ROCs
andmeet sustainability criteria to be viable in the long run. As
a result, bioenergy expansion in the UK focuses on co-firing as
a reversible option with a high adaptability to changes in
market conditions, while investments in asset specific tech-
nologies such as AD remain at much lower levels than in
Germany [70].
3.3. Adjustment of support schemes: transaction costs
of adaptation, adaptive efficiency, and policy uncertainty
In Germany, adjustments to new information regarding pri-
vate and external costs, or GHG and security of supply bene-
fits, require a revision of the EEG, in whichmajor changesmay
be implemented. Given the high stakes involved for bioenergy
and other RES investors, political transaction costs of revision
processes can be significant. At the same time, reversibility of
past policy decisions is low, because bioenergy technologies
receive remuneration according to the version of the EEG they
became operational under for 20 years. Changes applying to
existing plants would counteract the protection of existing
investments, with lasting impacts on political credibility and
planning security. An exception are ordinances authorised as
part of the EEG, which allow for a simplified legislative
procedure to pass regulation on specific topics, which may
then also pertain to existing plants. For example, the EEG 2012
and EEG 2014 authorise an ordinance on the introduction of
sustainability criteria for solid and gaseous bioenergy carriers.
However, it is not clear yet when requirements will come into
effect and what exactly they would entail; this also depends
on developments in EU legislation. For incentivising demand-
oriented production behaviour, the EEG 2012 introduced the
sliding FIP in combination with a flexibility premium for
biogas plants which compensates for the costs of investments
in plant flexibilisation [67]. The measure is associated with
additional support costs, but increases existing plants' ability
to generate security of supply benefits without compromising
their planning security. Meanwhile, by steering technology
choices through detailed specifications and eligibility re-
quirements, openness to experimentation is restrained;
however, the degree to which detailed specifications apply
varies between technologies and versions of the EEG.ainty in bioenergy policy designeA case study analysis of UK
nergy (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.biombioe.2015.03.029
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information. In these, stakes for investors are also quite high;
however, given that only ROC levels are determined, not
remuneration rates as such, information requirements for
policy makers and political transaction costs may be some-
what lower compared to the FIT/FIP scheme. The market-
based determination of remuneration also improves the
reversibility of policy decisions e even though ROC levels per
megawatt-hour are guaranteed for 20 years, their value is not
constant; if production costs, for example, were lower than
expected, the quantity of bioenergy ROCs would increase,
leading to an eventual decrease in ROC prices and profitability
of new investments. In this way, a degree of automatic feed-
back is established. New information about GHG balances or
external costs, meanwhile, would require an adjustment of
sustainability criteria; here, the commitment not to change at
least GHG mitigation requirements until 2027 limits the
reversibility of policy decisions. While having security about
the GHG reduction trajectory is important as an investment
safeguard, the remaining degree of flexibility depends on how
undertaking “non-unilateral” changes involving producers
and other stakeholders will be implemented in practice; while
this might entail a high transaction cost process, it could also
potentially become an example of inclusive decision-making,
which Upham, Riesch, Tomei and Thornley [71] recommend
for dealing with bioenergy-related uncertainties. Given that
market actors are free to decide the parameters of their pro-
jects, as long as as they fall into technology bands and fulfil
sustainability criteria, the RO's openness to experimentation
seems reasonably high.
Overall, the adaptive efficiency of the German FIT/FIP
scheme appears to be rather low; conversely, policy uncer-
tainty for existing plants is also low. Nonetheless, the need
for frequent revisions to incoporate learning imposes policy
uncertainty on future bioenergy investors and technology
developers. In the RO, technology choices are more decen-
tralised by comparison, resulting in higher adaptive efficiency.
Particularly the use of sustainability certification which sets
clear framework conditions and leaves detailed technology
and resource decisions to producers may perform better than
a central steering of choices; however, it is of central impor-
tance how the process for implementing changes to criteria
and methodology is designed. Accordingly, policy uncertainty
for existing plants in the RO mainly results from potential
changes in sustainability requirements, while for future in-
vestors and technology developers, the future development of
other political framework conditions such as the stringency of
RES targets and deployment support levels are also relevant.
3.4. Implications for bioelectricity policy design
Table 4 summarises main findings of the case study analysis.
The results show that there is no easy answer as to which
instrument type and design options perform best overall e
rather, both schemes reflect different choices regarding the
balancing of trade-offs. Accordingly, policy recommendations
have to take different priorities of policy makers into account,
as well as the country-specific context.
For differentiating bioenergy pathways according to GHG
benefits and other environmental impacts, for instance,Please cite this article in press as: Purkus A, et al., Handling uncert
and German bioelectricity policy instruments, Biomass and Bioesustainability certification shows several advantages over a
central steering of technology and feedstock choices. It per-
forms better in encouraging decentralised search processes,
and incentivises improvements over time, if requirements are
tightened. Moreover, it promises advantages in terms of
adaptive efficiency (see Table 4), although this requires a
careful design of adjustment processes that leave room for
policy learning while enabling market actors to form stable
expectations. However, the implementation of sustainability
certification is associated with significant transaction costs
[45]. In the German case with its focus on small to medium-
scale plants, bioenergy value chains are predominantly
regional, reducing uncertainty about legal framework condi-
tions of biomass production compared to the UK, where im-
ports of solid biomass play an important role [59,69,70,72].
Also, smaller average capacities result in a higher number
of actors who have to engage in certification activities,
increasing transaction costs. In such a context, a central
steering approach to technology differentiation can be the
more efficient option. Here, it would be advisable to use
eligibility criteria to guide plant design and operation de-
cisions with central impacts on GHG balances and other
environmental effects, as adopted in the EEG 2012. Otherwise,
uncertainty about the net external benefits of bioelectricity
production would be high. To reduce policy uncertainty about
future adjustments, it would be recommendable to credibly
commit to strategic guidelines for future bioenergy policy,
including for example a prioritisation of GHG mitigation as a
policy aim [73,74].
The choice between price and quantity instruments like-
wise reflects political priorities. The RO sets high-powered
incentives to search for low cost options within technology
bands, but accepts low planning security for market actors.
The prioritisation of static cost-effectiveness concerns is
reinforced by the ROC price ceiling, which limits the private
costs of RES expansion but increases uncertainty for pro-
ducers. This is reflected in the preference for bioelectricity
options with low asset specificity such as co-firing and con-
versions, which can be redeployed if political and market
framework conditions change. More generally, the focus on
static cost-effectiveness has resulted in a slower pace of RES
expansion compared to Germany [75e77]. Political decisions
to offer greater investment safeguards to RES producers have
contributed to the introduction of feed-in tariffs for selected
technologies in 2010 and the phase-out of the RO in favour of
the CfD scheme [78]. The latter is designed as an administered
sliding FIP, with a competitive bidding element when avail-
able budgets are breached [79]. In the German case, on the
other hand, the price-based FIT/FIP scheme has been suc-
cessful in incentivising high levels of asset specific in-
vestments, but the costs of implementing RES targets have
proven to be a contentious issue in the political debate [63,80].
This has contributed to the recent strong reductions in refer-
ence prices for comparatively costly bioelectricity pathways;
given the limited availability of low cost resources, this is
expected to effectively put a stop on further bioelectricity
expansion [65,72]. Remuneration cuts also limit the effec-
tiveness of the newly introduced quantity constraint. In
principle, however, the analysis shows that a well-designed
“breathing cap” can be an effective solution for balancingainty in bioenergy policy designeA case study analysis of UK
nergy (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.biombioe.2015.03.029
Table 4 e Summary of case study results.
UK renewables obligation German FIT/FIP scheme
Minimisation of social
costs of errors
 Banded ROC allocation supports diffu-
sion of portfolio of RES technologies
 Price ceiling for ROCs limits private
costs of bioenergy expansion, if they are
higher than expected by policy makers
 Both measures increase uncertainty
about meeting a target share of RES in
electricity supply
 No direct control of bioenergy expan-
sion levels
 Cost-based reference prices allow for
direct control of technology mix
 Quantity constraint limits bioenergy
expansion and total support costs, if
private costs of bioenergy production
are lower than expected by policy
makers
 Coordination of technology-specific
expansion corridors and overall RES
targets remains challenging
 Frequent adjustments of support levels
can increase policy uncertainty
Allocation of uncertainties  Market actors bear uncertainties about
ROC price developments, technology
and feedstock costs
 Uncertainties about GHG benefits and
external costs are shared by market
actors and policy makers
 No specific steering mechanism for
security of supply benefits
 Policy makers bear large share of static
and dynamic cost uncertainties (except
those concerning feedstock cost
developments)
 GHG benefit and external cost un-
certainties are borne by policy makers
 Specific incentives for provision of
security of supply benefits
Balance between incentive
intensity and planning security
 Strong incentives to lower production
costs and costs ofmeeting sustainability
criteria
 Dynamic incentives for improvements
in GHG balance; apart from that, few
incentives to improve environmental
performance beyond minimum
standards
 Planning security for existing plants is
low, due to uncertainty about future
remuneration levels and compliance of
supply chains with sustainability
criteria
 Result: preference for investments with
low asset specificity (co-firing)
 Low incentive intensity to reduce
production costs, as long as profits are
satisfactory
 Few incentives to improve GHG balance
and environmental performance, as
long as eligibility requirements are met
 High planning security for existing
plants
 Result: has incentivised high levels of
asset specific investments (dedicated
biomass plants)
Transaction costs
of adjustment,
adaptive efficiency
and policy
uncertainty
 Major adjustments require banding
reviews; political transaction costs are
somewhat lower than for the FIT/FIP
scheme, due to lower information
requirements
 Policy decisions are reversible to a
certain degree, primarily through “non-
unilateral” changes to sustainability
requirements
 High openness to experimentation
 Long-term commitment to sustainabil-
ity requirements reduces policy uncer-
tainty, if considered credible; new
projects face policy uncertainty about
stringency of RES targets and ROC levels
 Major adjustments require revision of
the EEG, with high political transaction
costs
 Low reversibility of policy decisions
 Central steering of technology choices
limits openness to experimentation
 Policy uncertainty is low for existing
plants, but can be high for future
investors and technology developers
because of frequent adjustments of
reference prices and eligibility
requirements
b i om a s s a n d b i o e n e r g y x x x ( 2 0 1 5 ) 1e1 612planning security for investors with control over overall sup-
port costs and expansion levels. RES deployment support in
Germany, meanwhile, will transition to a competitive bidding
scheme in 2017, reflecting a growing emphasis on increasing
incentive intensity for cost reductions [81].
Given the new EU state aid guidelines' preference for
competitive bidding schemes, implications for handling
simultaneous cost and benefit uncertainties are a highly
relevant topic for future research [82,83]. In principle, bidding
processes could allow projects to compete on a cost as well as
benefit basis, thereby providing a higher flexibility regardingPlease cite this article in press as: Purkus A, et al., Handling uncert
and German bioelectricity policy instruments, Biomass and Bioefeasible plant concepts. Once successful, investorswould then
have planning security that a certain remuneration would be
received for a time span or contingent of megawatt-hours
produced. However, past experiences with bidding processes
reveal challenges relating to low implementation rates, high
transaction costs and adverse impacts on market structure
[84,85]. Moreover, if a bidding scheme was implemented on
top of an existing FIT or FIP scheme, planning security for
plants already in operation could be compromised, because
new plants would enter into competition with old plants for
low cost feedstocks. This illustrates the challenges ofainty in bioenergy policy designeA case study analysis of UK
nergy (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.biombioe.2015.03.029
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and feedstock choices to a competitive system.4. Conclusions
Using the UK Renewables Obligation and the German feed-in
tariff/feed-in premium scheme as case studies, this paper
has analysed the implications of alternative instrument
choices and design options for the handling of uncertainties in
bioelectricity deployment support. Our results show that for
devising effective policies, not only choices between price and
quantity instruments and central and decentral approaches to
technology differentiation are relevant e in fact, different
political priorities canmake different solutions advantageous.
In line with other institutionally-oriented analyses of RES
policies [20,86e88], findings emphasise the importance of
detailed policy design, which determines the exact balance
between cost control, incentive intensity, planning security
and adaptive efficiency. This includes the design of hybrid
elements, such as price ceilings and quantity constraints, as
well as policy adjustment processes. Here, consistency in
policy decisions and the effective inclusion of stakeholders
emerge as important guiding principles for policy design
[30,71,87]. Finally, it needs to be stressed that the challenges of
handling cost and benefit uncertainties of bioenergy use
cannot be solved by deployment support alone e rather, it
needs to be integrated into a wider policy mix, encompassing
measures which support a functional innovation system for
low carbon technologies as well as effective framework con-
ditions for sustainable land use.
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